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Property Rights and Sacred Sites: Federal 
Regulatory Responses to American Indian 
Religious Claims on Public Land 
Marcia Yablon 
INTRODUCTION 
According to the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Kw’st’an 
Sacred Sites at Indian Pass in Imperial County, California, are one of 
America’s eleven most endangered historic places.1 For thousands of years, 
American Indians from the Quechan tribe have undertaken spiritual 
pilgrimages to these sites and conducted religious ceremonies known as 
Keruk, in which they have cremated their dead and assisted in bringing 
them to the next world.2 These sites are on the National Trust’s list because, 
in addition to being rich in spiritual and cultural significance, Indian Pass is 
also rich in gold. Glamis Gold Ltd., a Canadian mining company, is seeking 
permission to extract the gold; if granted, such permission will result in “a 
massive 1,600-acre cyanide heap-leach gold-mine that will leave a gaping 
hole in the ground and a skyscraper-size mound of toxic waste.”3 
The situation at Indian Pass is not unique. Dozens and potentially 
hundreds of Indian sacred sites face similar threats.4 For those seeking to 
 
1. The National Trust issues an annual list of the eleven most endangered historic places 
in the United States. The 2002 list included the Kw’st’an Sacred Sites as well as a collection 
of Indian sacred sites along the Missouri River. Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., America’s 11 Most 
Endangered Historic Places 2002, at http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/2002/sacredsites.html 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2004) [hereinafter Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., Endangered Historic 
Places 2002]. In addition, the 2003 list included the Zuni Salt Lake, discussed in Part III. Nat’l 
Trust for Historic Pres., America’s 11 Most Endangered Historic Places 2003, at 
http://www.nationaltrust.org/11Most/2003/index.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2004). 
2. Nat’l Trust for Historic Pres., Endangered Historic Places 2002, supra note 1. 
3. Id. 
4. The number of threatened sites has varied over the years. In 1993, the Association on 
American Indian Affairs identified forty-four sites as threatened by tourism, development, and 
vandalism. Karen L. Michel, Indians To Ask U.S. To Bolster Law on Religious Freedom, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1993, at 1A. In November 2002, the National Congress of American 
Indians identified twenty-three sites as facing such threats. Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, 
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protect such sites, both the problems and the solution are clear. Most sacred 
sites supporters believe that the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to find that 
the First Amendment mandates the protection of sacred sites has led to this 
precarious and distressing situation.5 They further believe that the only way 
to ensure the protection of these sites is either to overrule the Court’s 
previous decisions6 or to pass a comprehensive statute giving tribes the 
power to prevent the destruction or development of their sacred sites.7 
Those holding this view believe that anything less than these types of 
sweeping measures will be disastrous for the future of Indian sacred sites. 
Yet as widespread as this belief is, it may not be correct. Furthermore, it 
may actually be a good thing for society as a whole that these proposed 
protections have not succeeded. 
Indian sacred sites are lands that hold significant spiritual value for an 
Indian tribe. These sites may be discrete geological monuments such as 
Bear Lodge (also known as Devils Tower) in Wyoming, a sixty-million-
year-old rock formation made from the hardened magma of an extinct 
volcano,8 or wide swaths of land such as the Indian Pass Sacred Sites, a 
series of trails running from Los Angeles to Mexico.9 Some sites factor into 
a tribe’s creation myth or are vital to the continuing practice of a tribe’s 
 
Resolution #SD-02-018, Protection of Threatened Sacred Places: An Urgent Priority, 
http://www.ncai.org/data/docs/resolution/2002Annual/018.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2004). 
5. See, e.g., Samuel D. Brooks, Note, Native American Indians’ Fruitless Search for First 
Amendment Protection of Their Sacred Religious Sites, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 521, 546 (1990) 
(stating that “the Court severely narrowed the protection that the first amendment has traditionally 
given religious practices and incorrectly concluded that there was no burden on any Native 
American Indian religious practice”). 
6. Joel Brady, “Land Is Itself a Sacred, Living Being”: Native American Sacred Site 
Protection on Federal Public Land Amidst the Shadows of Bear Lodge, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
153, 172-73 (1999-2000) (“[T]he hope is that Bear Lodge will actually make its way to the 
Supreme Court and set new precedent [regarding the constitutionality of protecting sacred 
sites].”). 
7. For an example of such legislation, see the narrowly defeated California bills S. 1828, 
2001-2002 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), WL 2001 CA S.B. 1828 (SN), and S. 483, 
2001-2002 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002), WL 2001 CA S.B. 483 (SN), which would have 
given “Native American tribes in California de facto veto power to strike down public and private 
development projects throughout the state,” Bill Horn, Clash of Cultures, Religions, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Sept. 12, 2002, at B13. Fifty California tribes supported the bills. James May, 
Davis Vetoes Sacred Sites Bill, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Oct. 9, 2002, at A1; see also Brady, 
supra note 6, at 175-78 (discussing the Native American Cultural Protection and Free Exercise of 
Religion Act of 1994, S. 2269, 103d Cong. (1994), which would have increased protection for 
Indian sacred sites but failed in the Senate, in large part due to Establishment Clause concerns 
over its constitutionality); Shawna Lee, Note, Government Managed Shrines: Protection of Native 
American Sacred Site Worship, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 265, 304-08 (2000) (discussing the 
difficulties of drafting constitutional sacred sites protection legislation). 
8. Charlton H. Bonham, Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge and the Uphill Battle Facing Native 
American Religion on Public Lands, 20 LAW & INEQ. 157, 174 (2002). 
9. A Bill To Protect Sacred Native American Federal Lands: Hearing on H.R. 5155 Before 
the House Comm. on Res., 107th Cong. 58 (2002) (statement of R. Timothy McCrum, Partner, 
Crowell & Moring LLP, on behalf of Glamis Imperial Corp.) [hereinafter Sacred Land Hearings]. 
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religion.10 For example, for the past 10,000 years, the Lakota have 
performed their most important religious ceremonies, such as yearly Sun 
Dances, at Bear Lodge.11 Conversely, other sites are used less regularly and 
for multiple purposes. The Quechan tribe has used Indian Pass for a variety 
of religious purposes, including Keruk, the ceremony of bringing the dead 
into the next world; vision quests, where tribal members run in search of 
visions; and prayer circles.12 
Just as there are different types of sacred sites, these sites face many 
different types of threats. For instance, Bear Lodge is a national monument 
and, as such, is in no danger of being demolished or developed. But for 
those tribes that believe Bear Lodge is a sacred site, simply having the site 
open to the public—especially for activities such as rock climbing—is seen 
as a serious threat. The threat to Indian Pass is even starker: Parts of it face 
destruction if developers are given the right to dig up the land and turn it 
into a leach mine. Although the threats to these sites are serious, the costs of 
protecting them are just as significant. The difficulty with sacred sites 
protection is that preventing development and other uses of these lands 
often has a huge economic impact. For instance, the Glamis gold mine 
alone may be worth as much as fifty million dollars.13 
All sacred sites controversies involve the issue of control: Who has the 
right to control how these sites are used and who gets to use them? The 
difficulty of the issue is compounded by its magnitude. There are literally 
tens of thousands of sacred sites. For example, in South Dakota’s Black 
Hills alone, “[t]here are hundreds and estimated thousands of sacred 
sites.”14 Similarly, the shores of the Missouri River “have hundreds of 
Indian graves and sacred sites.”15 Furthermore, many of these sites 
encompass vast expanses of land. Indian Pass is estimated to cover 
“hundreds of square miles in southern California.”16 An area extending as 
much as fifteen miles inland along the entire 1100-mile length of the 
California coast is also considered a sacred site.17 In fact, an expansive 
 
10. Bonham, supra note 8, at 175. 
11. Id. at 175-76 & n.137. 
12. Daniel Kraker, Defending the Sacred: Tribes Closer to Meaningful Protection of 
Religious Sites, AM. INDIAN REP., Nov. 2002, at 12, 14. 
13. Courtney Ann Coyle, Defending Quechan Indian Pass—Again, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY, Nov. 12, 2003, at A4. In addition, the development of these lands also frequently brings 
much-needed employment opportunities. See infra text accompanying note 206 (discussing the 
Zuni Salt Lake). 
14. David Melmer, Black Hills Defenders Raise Management Issues, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY, Oct. 1, 2003, at B2. 
15. Bill Lambrecht, Boaters Will Face River with Perils Aplenty, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Dec. 15, 2002, at A1. 
16. Sacred Land Hearings, supra note 9, at 58 (statement of R. Timothy McCrum, Partner, 
Crowell & Moring LLP, on behalf of Glamis Imperial Corp.). 
17. James May, Lawmakers Aim To Protect Sacred Sites Along California Coast, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY, July 16, 2003, at A1. 
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definition of sacred sites could encompass a sizeable portion of the 
undeveloped land in the United States. Accordingly, who decides which 
sites get protected has enormous ramifications. 
Currently, federal land management agencies are responsible for the 
majority of decisions regarding Indian sacred sites located on federal land. 
Given that, in the past, land management agencies were often responsible 
for the decisions to destroy sacred sites, it is little wonder that most tribes 
and sacred sites supporters are dubious that these agencies will provide any 
real protection.18 But such mistrust may no longer be justified. Land 
management agencies are increasingly working to protect sacred sites, and 
in many instances such agencies are able to provide a form of protection 
that most of society would find preferable to the protections available 
through the courts or Congress. Unfortunately, many scholars are still so 
caught up in the perceived lack of broad sacred sites protection that they 
seem unable to acknowledge that many of these sites are being preserved 
without any sweeping protections. This Note argues that agency 
management of Indian sacred sites, in conjunction with statutory 
consultation provisions and backed by judicial enforcement, is the best 
form of protection for these sites. In addition, it shows that because of the 
effectiveness of agency protections, the persistent scholarly arguments for 
broader judicial or legislative protections are no longer appropriate. This 
Note also examines the problems with relying on exclusively judicial or 
legislative protection. It concludes that, because of their greater flexibility, 
agencies are able to offer a method of sacred sites protection that is better 
for society as a whole, even if it is less desirable from the viewpoint of 
individual tribes. 
Part I examines the history of Indian sacred sites protection. It discusses 
the historic lack of agency protection for these sites, the attempt and failure 
to win judicial protection for them in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery 
Protective Ass’n,19 and the impact of Lyng on later sacred sites protection 
efforts. Part II focuses on recent federal agency efforts to preserve sacred 
sites, the effectiveness of these efforts, and the reasons behind this change 
in agency policy. Part III argues that agencies are better able to consider the 
interests of all users of sacred sites, and therefore that agency protection, 
when combined with statutory consultation provisions and judicial 
enforcement, is preferable to the exclusively judicial and legislative 
protections typically sought by sacred sites advocates. Part III also 
addresses common criticisms of agency accommodation and explains why 
 
18. See, e.g., George Linge, Ensuring the Full Freedom of Religion on Public Lands: Devils 
Tower and the Protection of Indian Sacred Sites, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 314 (2000). 
19. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
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agency protection does not leave tribes at the mercy of agency goodwill and 
changing politics. 
I.  THE HISTORY OF INDIAN SACRED SITES PROTECTION 
The distrust many sacred sites advocates feel toward land management 
agencies is warranted. Historically, these agencies have frequently allowed, 
and even actively encouraged, the development of Indian sacred sites. In 
1979, for instance, the U.S. Forest Service approved the development and 
expansion of the government-owned Snow Bowl ski area on the San 
Francisco Peaks in the Coconino National Forest of Arizona, despite 
knowing that the Peaks were sacred to both the Navajo and Hopi tribes.20 
Similarly, in 1963, the National Park Service built the Glen Canyon Dam in 
northern Arizona, creating Lake Powell and submerging a sacred Navajo 
prayer spot. In addition to cutting off access to these now-submerged lands, 
the formation of the lake dramatically increased the number of visitors to 
Rainbow Bridge, a geological wonder and an important Indian sacred site.21 
Before the creation of the lake, few tourists visited the bridge, but after the 
lake was created, the bridge became a popular tourist destination, adding to 
the desecration of the site. The increased tourism was actively encouraged 
by the Park Service, which licensed the operation of tour boats and other 
tourist activities around the bridge.22 In yet another instance of agency 
involvement in sacred site destruction, the Tennessee Valley Authority—a 
federal agency created by Congress to provide flood control, navigation, 
and electric power in the Tennessee Valley region—decided to flood lands 
along the Little Tennessee River, including burial grounds that were sacred 
to the Cherokee and integral to their religious practices.23 
These are just some examples that demonstrate the indifference 
agencies have often shown in the past toward the protection of sacred sites 
and Indian culture.24 It is this history of indifference that has convinced 
many scholars and tribal advocates that agencies will never protect Indian 
sacred sites and that the only way to preserve these lands is through judicial 
or legislative measures.25 
 
20. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
21. For factual background, see Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 643 (D. Utah 1977), 
aff’d, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980). 
22. See id. 
23. See Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 480 F. Supp. 608, 610 (E.D. Tenn. 1979), aff’d, 620 
F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980). 
24. For other examples of agencies violating Indian religious practices and destroying sacred 
sites, see Michael J. Simpson, Accommodating Indian Religions: The Proposed 1993 Amendment 
to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 54 MONT. L. REV. 19, 33 nn.76-77, 34 n.82, 35 
nn.87-88 (1993). 
25. See Linge, supra note 18, at 307, 314 (bemoaning the fact that the federal government 
“routinely has acted or has permitted private actions that rendered Indian sacred sites inaccessible 
YABLONFINAL.DOC 4/23/2004 1:06 AM 
1628 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 113: 1623 
A. Sacred Sites Litigation Prior to Lyng 
Throughout the 1980s, Indian tribes brought numerous First 
Amendment suits challenging the constitutionality of developing Indian 
sacred sites located on federal land. These tribes based their challenges on 
free exercise grounds, claiming that development on lands they considered 
sacred would unconstitutionally prevent them from observing religious 
rituals connected to these sites.26 However, even before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 
the case most scholars agree ended the possibility of using the First 
Amendment to protect sacred sites,27 free exercise challenges met with little 
success. Circuit courts hearing these First Amendment cases made it 
abundantly clear that suits attacking land agency plans for the development 
of sacred sites would not be viewed favorably. Over and over again, tribes 
lost these challenges.28 
In Wilson v. Block, the Hopi and Navajo tribes challenged the 
aforementioned expansion of the Snow Bowl ski resort on their sacred 
lands.29 The D.C. Circuit rejected their challenge and held that the agency’s 
decision to permit development did not violate the First Amendment 
because the agency did not deny the tribes access to their sacred sites.30 
Similarly, in Badoni v. Higginson, in which the Navajo Indians challenged 
the National Park Service’s decision to create Lake Powell and permit 
tourists to visit Rainbow Bridge, the Tenth Circuit held that the agency’s 
decision did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.31 Like the D.C. Circuit, 
the Badoni court based its opinion in large part on the fact that the Indians 
in the area still had access to the bridge.32 In both cases, continued access 
was a key factor in the courts’ decisions to uphold the development on 
sacred sites. 
However, in Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, the case 
challenging the flooding of burial sites in the Tennessee Valley, even the 
preservation of tribal access to integral sacred sites was not considered 
 
and unusable for religious ceremonies,” and arguing that although “courts scarcely have 
considered the Indian claims in any but the strictest, most limiting terms,” there is “an alternative 
theory of ‘full’ religious freedom which would support [sacred sites protection]”); Lee, supra note 
7, at 265 (“Currently, there is no general sacred site protection law. The need for such protection 
is apparent . . . . In addition, there is no binding judicial precedent that would offer sacred site 
protection.”). 
26. In these cases, tribes typically sought injunctive relief. See, e.g., Sequoyah, 480 F. Supp. 
at 610; Badoni, 455 F. Supp. at 643. 
27. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
28. David S. Johnston, Note, The Native American Plight: Protection and Preservation of 
Sacred Sites, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 443, 448 (2002). 
29. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
30. Id. at 740. 
31. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980). 
32. See id. at 178. 
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necessary.33 In Sequoyah, the Sixth Circuit held that the agency’s decision 
to flood the valley did not infringe the Cherokee Indians’ free exercise 
rights, despite the fact that the released waters completely submerged 
numerous sacred sites. According to the court, the flooding was 
constitutional because the tribe had failed to offer enough evidence of the 
centrality or indispensability of that particular valley to Cherokee religious 
observance.34 
In these cases, the courts paid little more than lip service to the land 
management agencies’ obligations to consider tribal interests in the lands 
they had managed. For example, in Wilson, the court concluded that the 
Forest Service had an obligation only “to avoid unnecessary interference 
with[] traditional Indian religious practices.”35 The Wilson court did not 
make any effort to encourage agency accommodation of Indian interests. 
Although it held that agencies were obligated to consider tribal interests, the 
opinion described this obligation as one with “no teeth,” implying it would 
have little effect on how agency decisions were evaluated.36 
This dismissive attitude toward accommodation changed in Lyng. 
Although a tribe lost once again, the Court adopted a different conception 
of land management agencies’ obligation to consider and accommodate 
tribal interests. In foreclosing judicial protection, the Lyng Court shut off 
one method of protecting sacred sites, but suggested another, more feasible 
method in its place—agency accommodation. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Lyng 
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n effectively ended 
the possibility of using the First Amendment to force federal agencies to 
protect Indian sacred sites.37 In Lyng, the U.S. Forest Service attempted to 
complete a logging road through the Six Rivers National Forest in 
northwestern California, despite the religious use of the area by three Indian 
tribes.38 These tribes challenged the construction of the road, arguing that it 
violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 
The Court held that there was no constitutional violation because the 
road would not coerce the tribes into violating their religious beliefs:39 
According to the Court, the case was primarily a dispute over property 
 
33. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980). 
34. Id. at 1164. 
35. Wilson, 708 F.2d at 746 (emphasis added). 
36. Id. at 747. 
37. See infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
38. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441-42 (1988). 
39. Id. at 450. 
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rather than one of religious freedom.40 As in previous cases, the Court made 
clear that the power to decide the future of these sites should remain with 
the government almost exclusively—that the government, in its capacity as 
a property owner, should have wide latitude to manage its own property as 
it likes. According to the Court, any other decision would result in a 
“diminution of the Government’s property rights, and the concomitant 
subsidy of the Indian religion.”41 
Yet at the same time that the Lyng Court upheld “[t]he government’s 
rights to the use of its own land,” it also explained that this right “need not 
and should not discourage [federal agencies] . . . from accommodating 
religious practices like those engaged in by the Indian respondents.”42 
Indeed, the Court’s opinion evinced a strong support for agency 
accommodation of Indian sacred sites generally. More specifically, it 
encouraged accommodations that would “minimize the impact”43 of the 
disputed development, and praised the Forest Service for the efforts the 
agency had already made to reduce this impact—such as picking the route 
“farthest removed from contemporary spiritual sites”44 and conducting a 
“comprehensive study of the effects that the project would have on the 
cultural and religious value” of the area.45 
C. Why Lyng Was Right: The Problems with Broad Judicial Protection for 
Sacred Sites 
Although the Lyng Court was sympathetic to Indian concerns regarding 
their sacred sites, the Court believed that land-use decisions should remain 
with land management agencies and that giving control over sacred sites to 
Indian tribes would be an extremely risky proposition. The Court’s concern 
was apparent from its statement that “[h]owever much we might wish that it 
were otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were required to 
satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and desires.”46 In particular, the Court 
was worried about the future of sacred site lands and the consequences that 
would follow if it required the government to manage these lands in 
 
40. Justice Brennan’s dissent summarized the majority’s position, stating that “the Court 
believes that Native Americans who request that the Government refrain from destroying their 
religion effectively seek to exact from the Government de facto beneficial ownership of federal 
property.” Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
41. Id. at 453 (majority opinion). 
42. Id. at 454. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
45. Id. The Court described this policy as part of the Forest Service’s duty “‘to protect and 
preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the 
traditional religions of the American Indian.’” Id. at 454-55 (quoting the American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA) of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1982)). 
46. Id. at 452. 
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accordance with tribal “religious needs and desires.”47 Such a decision 
would have effectively granted tribes the exclusive right to control the use 
of these lands, and the Court was understandably wary of giving them this 
right. As the Lyng Court concluded, “Whatever rights the Indians may have 
to the use of the area, . . . those rights do not divest the Government of its 
right to use what is, after all, its land.”48 Although the tribes in Lyng were 
worried about the overuse of sacred sites land, the Court was just as worried 
about the potential for underuse. 
The Lyng Court correctly recognized that the problem with judicial 
sacred sites protection is that it is overbroad and would enable tribes to 
prevent the development of vast swaths of government land. The “tragedy 
of the commons” explains why a resource will be prone to overuse when 
multiple owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given 
resource and no one has the right to exclude another. Conversely, as 
Michael Heller demonstrated in The Tragedy of the Anticommons, “[w]hen 
there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone 
to underuse.”49 The tribes in Lyng had use privileges, but no right to 
exclude others from accessing their sacred sites. By seeking a judicial 
ruling guaranteeing them a right to veto all proposed uses of sacred site 
land, they were attempting to solidify this right to exclude. If the Court had 
granted the tribes this veto right, judicial precedent would have resulted in 
the granting of similar veto power to hundreds of other tribes, virtually 
guaranteeing that all Indian sacred sites and surrounding lands would 
remain unused by anyone but the tribes.50 In addition, the veto right sought 
would not only have been held by the tribe as a group, but would have been 
available to individual members as well, because the right to free exercise is 
a personal right. As a result, even if a developer were to secure a tribe’s 
permission to build on a sacred site, dissenting tribal members would still 
have been able to claim that their individual free exercise rights were being 
violated. 
Although the tribes in Lyng hoped to block all future development, 
“perpetual non-use of property” is rarely optimal.51 According to Heller, 
“[A]n anticommons regime is a threat to, rather than the epitome of, 
optimal use.”52 The solution to the tragedy of the anticommons is to 
eliminate overlapping property rights that create the power to veto potential 
 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 453. 
49. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from 
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622, 624 (1998). 
50. Heller disputed the previous definition of an anticommons, which required that everyone 
have the right to exclude. Instead, Heller posited that “non-use can occur even when a few actors 
have rights of exclusion in a resource that each wants to use.” Id. at 669. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
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uses of the land.53 The Lyng Court’s decision to leave control of these lands 
solely in the hands of the government ensured that federal lands would not 
be subject to the tragedy of the anticommons. By ruling against the tribes, 
the Court avoided a situation in which tribes could guarantee the nonuse of 
significant portions of government land. The Lyng Court realized that the 
veto power requested by the tribes “could easily require de facto beneficial 
ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public property,”54 and it 
accordingly acted to prevent such an occurrence. 
The Lyng Court made the right decision because it chose the method of 
protection that is optimal for society as a whole, even if it is less desirable 
from the view of individual tribes. Although the opposite ruling might have 
increased sacred sites protection, it would have come at too great a cost. 
The existence of other effective methods of protecting sacred sites, as I 
discuss in Part II, shows that the Court’s desire to avoid creating a vast 
religious servitude on huge expanses of public land was justified. By 
encouraging agency protection, the Court attempted to increase sacred sites 
protection, but not to such an extent that it would have generated vast social 
inefficiencies over broad swaths of government-owned land. 
D. The Criticisms of Lyng 
Scholars harshly criticized the Lyng decision for its perceived 
insensitivity to Indian religious beliefs and practices.55 These critics 
predicted that the Lyng decision would effectively eliminate the possibility 
of using the First Amendment to challenge agency decisions regarding the 
management of sacred sites, and post-Lyng decisions56 showed that their 
 
53. Id. at 677-78. 
54. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988). 
55. See, e.g., Alfred J. Sciarrino, The Rehnquist Court’s Free Exercise Collision on the 
Peyote Road, 23 CUMB. L. REV. 315, 329-30 (1993) (viewing Lyng as marking a “low point” in 
the Court’s modern history of free exercise jurisprudence); id. at 332 (quoting Leonard Haskie, 
Interim Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council of Window Rock, Arizona, as characterizing Lyng 
to be “a further blow to the religious freedom of Native American people”); Ellen Adair Page, 
Note, The Scope of the Free Exercise Clause: Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association, 68 N.C. L. REV. 410, 421 (1990) (concluding that Lyng’s restrictive test “reeks of 
injustice”); J. Brett Pritchard, Note, Conduct and Belief in the Free Exercise Clause: 
Developments and Deviations in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 
76 CORNELL L. REV. 268, 292 (1990) (commenting that the Lyng decision “exhibited ‘distressing 
insensitivity’” to religious liberties (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 41[4] (1963) 
(Stewart, J., concurring))); S. Alan Ray, Comment, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Association: Government Property Rights and the Free Exercise Clause, 16 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 483, 511 (1989) (arguing that the Lyng Court ignored past decisions supporting expansive 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause). 
56. See, e.g., United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404, 405 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that the 
Forest Service did not violate the First Amendment when it denied a group of Sioux Indians a 
special use permit that would have allowed them to occupy national forest land that they believed 
was sacred). 
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predictions were correct.57 Most tribes and scholars viewed this 
development as a serious blow to the protection of Indian sacred sites and 
were unimpressed with the Court’s encouragement of agency 
accommodation.58 Many of the same critics strongly agreed with the portion 
of the Lyng dissent arguing that the majority opinion “effectively bestowed 
on one party to this conflict [the federal government] the unilateral 
authority to resolve all future disputes in its favor, subject only to the 
Court’s toothless exhortation to be ‘sensitive’ to affected religions.”59 
Other critics focused on the fact that the Lyng Court’s concerns and 
decision were based on Anglo-American conceptions of property, which 
rest “on the notion ‘that property rights identify a private owner who has 
title to a set of valued resources with a presumption of full power over those 
resources.’”60 This understanding of property is very different from Indian 
conceptions of property, which view the “land as utterly incapable of 
reduction to ownership as property by human beings.”61 These 
commentators objected to the use of Western property values, so different 
from Indian understandings of property, to determine the future of Indian 
sacred sites.62 Howard Vogel strongly criticized this practice, stating that 
 
57. As Charlton Bonham wrote, 
The decision in Lyng effectively marked the end of Native American attempts to 
employ the Free Exercise Clause to protect Native American religious sites on public 
lands because it established the demanding “coerced or penalized” standard. Thus, 
despite the language of the Free Exercise Clause prohibiting governmental interference 
with religious practices, tribes have been unsuccessful in challenging government 
actions that harmed tribal sacred sites, which thereby interfered with tribal religious 
practices. 
Bonham, supra note 8, at 165 (footnote omitted). 
58. See sources cited supra note 55; see also Rita S. Mandosa, Another Promise Broken, 
40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 109, 111 (1993) (“[T]he greatest damage to Native American religious 
freedom has come from an April 19, 1988, decision by the United States Supreme Court in Lyng 
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association.”); Scott Dalton, Note, Saving Native 
American Religious Sites: The Haskell Medicine Wheel, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Winter 1995, at 
61, 66 (“The Lyng decision conclusively ended any hope by Native Americans with respect to [the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act’s] ability to protect their sacred sites when the Court 
found that AIRFA did not ‘create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual 
rights.’” (quoting Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455)); Johnston, supra note 28, at 450 (stating that the Lyng 
decision not only ended the possibility of litigation but made any attempts to pass sacred sites 
legislation more difficult because of the Establishment Clause issue). 
59. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 473 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoted in Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of 
Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach to Cultural Conflict over Native American 
Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757, 792 (2001). 
60. Angela R. Riley, Indian Remains, Human Rights: Reconsidering Entitlement Under the 
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 83 
(2002) (quoting Joseph W. Singer, Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in 
PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP 3, 4 (Charles 
Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000)). 
61. William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: Reparations, 
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 27 
(2002-2003). 
62. See Riley, supra note 60, at 93 (“Communal, land-based peoples conceive of and interpret 
ownership in ways that are foreign to, and diminished by, Anglo-American property regimes.”); 
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“the Anglo-American understanding of land, expressed through a 
conventional understanding of doctrinal principles of property law, shapes 
the Court’s reading of the facts and adds to the difficulty of seeking a 
resolution that might heal the conflict.”63 
The concern expressed by Vogel and others is justified. The Lyng 
decision was correct because it avoided an undesirable property situation, 
but it is also true that under many Indian conceptions of property, such a 
predicament would never have developed in the first place.64 But rather 
than revealing a problem with judicial sacred sites decisions, this concern 
about the Anglo-American values that underlay the Lyng decision actually 
supports the proposition that sacred sites determinations should be made by 
land management agencies: The Lyng Court’s Anglocentric reasoning is 
merely one in a number of striking illustrations of how agencies are better 
able to accommodate Indian values and beliefs than the courts or 
Congress.65 
E. The Limited Ability of Western Property Law To Protect American 
Indian Land Rights 
Historically, Western conceptions of property have harmed Indians. 
The earliest settlers used their understanding of property and ownership to 
expropriate tribal lands.66 In Johnson v. M’Intosh, English common law was 
used to reach the conclusion that Indian land ownership consisted solely of 
the right to sell title to the discovering sovereign.67 Since then, the Court 
has repeatedly upheld the imposition of Western property values upon 
Indian tribes as a means of determining the future of Indian lands. Yet 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in M’Intosh underscores the unsuitability 
of courts for this task. The M’Intosh opinion demonstrates how courts, as 
institutions created by the Western legal tradition, cannot escape from 
 
Rebecca Tsosie, Land, Culture, and Community: Reflections on Native Sovereignty and Property 
in America, 34 IND. L. REV. 1291, 1308 (2001) (“To the extent that courts continue to adjudicate 
intercultural claims within the Anglo-American property structure, it becomes important to ensure 
that this structure is not being used to unfairly suppress and disregard Native peoples’ interests.”). 
63. Vogel, supra note 59, at 783. 
64. See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 87 
(1985) (“[S]ome Indians professed bewilderment at the concept of owning the land. Indeed they 
prided themselves on not marking the land but rather on moving lightly through it, living with the 
land and with its creatures as members of the same family rather than as strangers who visited 
only to conquer the objects of nature.”). 
65. See infra Part III. 
66. Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of 
American Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1076 (2000) (noting that “[f]rom the 
beginning, English government in the New World refused to recognize the Indians as true title 
holders,” that “Virginia’s earliest settlers began to articulate a theoretical basis to deny Indian 
title,” and that the Puritans could not accept that hunter-gatherers were “really occupants of their 
lands”). 
67. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
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Western notions of property even when the Court believes those notions 
produce unjust results. In M’Intosh, Marshall expressed extreme discomfort 
with the position he was expounding, yet considered it unavoidable.68 
“Conquest,” he wrote, “gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror 
cannot deny, whatever the private and speculative opinions of individuals 
may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has been 
successfully asserted.”69 
The inability of Western law and legal institutions to protect native land 
rights is similarly demonstrated by the example of the English colonization 
of the Maori in New Zealand. In New Zealand, English property law was 
imposed on the Maori in order to facilitate land purchases from them.70 
Although the English decided to recognize Maori land rights only because 
such recognition was less costly than a war, once this decision was made, 
the English truly believed it benefited the Maori.71 As Colonial Governor 
Thomas Gore Browne acknowledged, in “most colonies of the Crown, the 
natives have been recognised as possessing certain possessory rights over 
the soil” short of full ownership, while in New Zealand, the Maori had “a 
right of proprietorship over their lands—not simply a general right of 
dominion, but a right of proprietorship like the landlords of estates.”72 Yet 
despite the English colonists’ belief that they were treating the Maori fairly, 
the imposition of Western property law still had detrimental consequences 
for the Maori people. They “ended up with much less land and very little 
money,” and with the loss of their system of property rights “so too went 
much of the traditional political structure of the tribes.”73 
Thus, considering how even the benevolent—or at least 
nonmalicious—imposition of Western notions of property has harmed 
native peoples, the continued lack of space for Indian property values in the 
Western legal tradition is understandably disconcerting. However, while 
Vogel’s criticism implicates court decisions, it does not necessarily apply to 
agency decisionmaking. The courts’ use of Western property law to decide 
 
68. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 12 n.5 (5th ed. 2002) (“The 
sarcasm and irony seen here and elsewhere in Marshall’s opinion suggest his embarrassment with 
what he had to write, and there is independent evidence that he was sympathetic to the plight of 
Native Americans.”). 
69. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 588. 
70. Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth-Century New 
Zealand, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 807, 830-31 (1999) (stating that the decision to “substitute the 
English for the Maori system of property ownership” was done to help land “speedily come into 
the market and become available for purposes of colonisation” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
71. Id. at 822 (remarking that “[t]he recognition of Maori title was a source of some pride to 
colonial government officials” who believed they had treated the Maori with “unvarying 
kindness” and that the colonization of New Zealand was achieved according to a “new and 
humane system” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
72. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
73. Id. at 844. 
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cases involving Indian sacred sites may be unfortunate, but it is also 
unavoidable. These courts were created to implement Anglo-American laws 
and are bound by judicial precedent. As a result, it is unlikely that even the 
most sympathetic court would consider it appropriate to discard precedent 
and incorporate Indian conceptions of property into its sacred sites 
decisions. As the Court of Federal Claims stated in Hage v. United States, 
“The Anglo-American case precedent is literally made up of tens of 
thousands of cases defining property rights over the better part of a 
millennium. . . . [J]udicial decision-making builds historically and logically 
upon past precedent in narrow cases and controversies rather than current 
general exigencies or sweeping political mandates.”74 
However, the Hage court also explained that this constraint is solely a 
characteristic of the judicial branch, remarking that “[t]he genius of our 
Framer[s’] tripartite division of constitutional power is the creation of 
separated institutions that each best deal with different categories of 
governmental decisions.”75 Agencies do not face the same restrictions as 
courts and are consequently much better suited to accommodate Indian 
conceptions of property and to use them when making their land-use 
determinations. Unlike courts, agencies are in a position to take competing 
understandings into account and provide a forum where Indian property 
values can have an impact on sacred sites decisions.76 Agencies are required 
to consult with Indian tribes when making land-use decisions that will 
affect them,77 and through these consultations, agencies are exposed to 
alternative conceptions of property. A number of recent examples 
demonstrate how such exposure has led some agencies to begin 
acknowledging the validity of Indian viewpoints in ways unlikely to ever 
occur in a court. 
One instance of how such discussions can expose and make agencies 
more receptive to Indian understandings of the world can be seen in the 
results of a recent conference between New York state agencies and 
representatives from New York’s Indian tribes. This conference was held to 
discuss various issues including the preservation of Indian sacred sites. At 
the conference, the Indian leaders explained a number of misunderstandings 
that were hurting the two groups’ ability to cooperate. “One example that 
was given was the difference in how the written word is viewed; while 
 
74. 35 Fed. Cl. 147, 151 (1996). 
75. Id. 
76. See, e.g., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing the Park Service’s creation of a voluntary ban on rock climbing during the month of 
June, the month when the Cherokee perform their most important religious rituals at the site); 
see also Brady, supra note 6, at 169 (noting that Deborah Liggett, Superintendent of Devils 
Tower, “was acutely aware of the significance of land to Native American religious practice”); 
infra Subsection II.C.1. 
77. See infra Section II.A. 
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[Anglo-American] society tends to memorialize everything of importance 
in writing and attaches great importance to the written word, Native culture 
is based on oral traditions, and the spoken word thus assumes great 
importance.”78 Such discussions show the potential for agencies to be 
influenced by exposure to Indian culture and beliefs and to help them avoid 
many of the problems that have arisen in the past, in this instance problems 
resulting from the emphasis on oral traditions in Indian culture.79 The 
discussions at the New York conference enabled the two groups to achieve 
the “first step in establishing a working relationship based on mutual 
understanding and respect.”80 
An even more striking example can be seen in the litigation over 
alleged unauthorized excavation of an Indian village and burial site in 
upstate New York. In describing the impact that consultations with the 
Seneca tribe about their culture and beliefs had on him, Christopher A. 
Amato, Deputy Chief of the New York State Attorney General’s 
Environmental Protection Bureau, stated that “an understanding of some of 
the traditional religious beliefs of the Senecas helped us to understand how 
extremely painful it was for tribal members to learn that the remains of their 
ancestors were being treated with disrespect.”81 He further added that 
learning about the tribe’s “culture and traditions not only helped frame the 
litigation but also formed the cornerstone of successful cooperation by 
enabling the parties to bridge cultural differences.”82 As Amato’s 
statements suggest, making agency officials aware of the differences 
between American Indian and Western cultures increases the likelihood that 
agencies will consider these alternative views when working with tribes on 
matters of tribal concern. 
 
78. Christopher A. Amato, Speaking with One Voice: Elements of Successful State/Tribal 
Collaboration in Environmental Enforcement, NAT’L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., Sept. 2002, at 3, 
12 n.16. 
79. A good example of this conflict can be seen in a 1976 suit brought by the Mashpee Indian 
tribe under the Nonintercourse Act. The Mashpee claimed that their tribal land had been taken 
without federal consent, but the district court dismissed the suit because the Mashpee failed to 
meet the definition of “tribe of Indians” under the Act. Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 
F. Supp. 940, 950 (D. Mass. 1978), aff’d sub nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 
F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979). One of the biggest problems for the Mashpee was the fact that although 
the tribe claimed to have been continuously self-governing, its claim lacked documentary support. 
According to one commentator, 
Some observers felt the court and jury in Mashpee Tribe heard these oral histories 
merely as “gaps” in the evidentiary record. “The stories that members of the Mashpee 
Tribe told were stories that legal ears could not hear. Thus the legal requirements of 
relevance rendered the Indian storytellers mute and the culture they were portraying 
invisible.” 
Stephen D. Osborne, Protecting Tribal Stories: The Perils of Propertization, 28 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 203, 224 n.133 (2003-2004) (quoting Gerald Torres & Kathryn Milun, Translating 
Yonnondio by Precedent and Evidence: The Mashpee Indian Case, 1990 DUKE L.J. 625, 649). 
80. Amato, supra note 78, at 5. 
81. Id. at 9. 
82. Id. 
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Therefore, although Lyng precluded the judicial protection sought by 
sacred sites advocates, the decision actually made it more likely that land 
management decisions would be influenced by Indian conceptions of 
property. The statutory consultation provisions created in response to the 
lack of judicial protection for sacred sites helped to pave the way for federal 
land agencies to better understand and accommodate tribal interests in their 
sacred sites. Since Lyng, agencies like the Park Service, the Forest Service, 
and the Bureau of Land Management have all increasingly sought ways to 
protect many of the Indian sacred sites located on federal lands and to 
accommodate the religious and cultural practices associated with them.83 
II.  THE EFFECTS OF PLACING SACRED SITES 
MANAGEMENT IN AGENCY HANDS 
After Lyng, it became clear that the courts would not mandate 
protection for Indian sacred sites, and that the majority of such sites would 
only be protected if federal land management agencies decided that they 
should be. Although most commentators have been pessimistic about 
agency protection, largely because “such accommodation is to be had only 
at the sufferance of the dominant culture, which does not go very far in 
honoring and respecting the diversity found in Native American culture,”84 
the actual results have been quite different than those commonly 
predicted.85 Contrary to the fears expressed by many, agencies are affording 
real protection to Indian sacred sites. Leaving these decisions in the hands 
of agencies may actually be the best solution for society in general, even if 
most tribes would still prefer complete control of these decisions. 
While it is unclear how much cases like Lyng directly influenced land 
management agencies, such judicial decisions affected Congress, and in 
turn Congress influenced the agencies. Supreme Court cases like Lyng and 
Employment Division v. Smith86 revealed the lack of judicial protections 
 
83. See infra Sections II.B-C. 
84. Vogel, supra note 59, at 789. 
85. For examples of such negative predictions, see id. See also Russel L. Barsh, Grounded 
Visions: Native American Conceptions of Landscapes and Ceremony, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 
127, 143-53 (2000) (arguing that the danger faced by Indian sacred sites is that their protection is 
left too much up to “agency discretion”); Kristen L. Boyles, Note, Saving Sacred Sites: The 1989 
Proposed Amendment to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1117, 
1118 (1991) (“Government agencies frequently make public land management decisions that 
affect Indian sacred sites located on federal land without considering Indian religion. This lack of 
cultural sensitivity continually threatens the practice of Indian religion.” (footnote omitted)); 
Luralene D. Tapahe, Comment, After the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Still No Equal 
Protection for First American Worshipers, 24 N.M. L. REV. 331, 347 n.72 (1994) (arguing that a 
stronger sacred sites statute would be the most effective way to prevent “agencies [from] harming 
sacred sites through development on federal land”). 
86. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that a statute forbidding use of peyote, a drug that plays a 
central role in worship for the Native American Church, did not violate the Free Exercise Clause). 
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afforded to Indian religious practices and sacred sites, and convinced 
Congress of the need to enact greater legislative protections. As a result, a 
number of statutes were passed or amended with the goal of aiding Indian 
religious and cultural preservation. In 1992, Congress amended the 
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) of 1966;87 it did the same in 
1988 for the Archeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) of 1979.88 It 
also passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993.89 
These acts have had a discernible influence on sacred sites protection. 
However, they are frequently overlooked because, as many critics have 
pointed out, the legal duties they impose are not particularly onerous.90 
A. The Enforceability of Statutory Consultation Provisions 
Commentators are making a mistake when they dismiss these statutes 
simply because they create few legal duties. Regardless of the paucity of 
statutory requirements and the ease with which they can be satisfied, this 
legislation has changed agency conceptions of their role with regard to the 
protection of Indian culture and religion. All of these acts make it clear that 
Congress expects land management agencies to listen to Indian concerns 
and try to accommodate Indian religious practices and protect their sacred 
sites. 
The 1992 NHPA amendments, for example, require that the national 
preservation program be conducted “in partnership with” affected “Indian 
tribes.”91 In interpreting this provision, agencies have understood their 
obligations under NHPA as 
requir[ing] the agency official to consult with any Indian tribe or 
Native Hawaiian organization that attaches religious and cultural 
 
87. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. XL, 
106 Stat. 4600, 4753-65 (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470x-6 (1988)). 
88. Amendments to Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 100-588, 
§ 1(d), 102 Stat. 2983, 2983 (1988) (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm (1988)). 
89. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified in scattered sections of 5 and 42 U.S.C.). 
90. See, e.g., Barsh, supra note 85, at 137-38 (“Each of these laws has significant 
limitations.”); Brady, supra note 6, at 173 (“[T]he legislation that has passed has generally been of 
little practical import.”). 
91. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1992 § 4002 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 470-1(2) (2000)). The amendments also inserted “Indian tribes and Native Hawaiian 
organizations,” id., into the list of groups the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation must 
“assist . . . to expand and accelerate their historic preservation programs and activities,” 16 U.S.C. 
§ 470-1(6). It should be noted, however, that prior to Lyng the 1980 amendments to NHPA 
announced that “[i]t shall be the policy of the Federal Government” to act “in partnership with the 
States, local governments, Indian tribes, and private organizations and individuals.” National 
Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, § 101, 94 Stat. 2987, 2988 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470-1). The 1980 amendments also required the Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation to “inform and educate . . . Indian tribes . . . as to the Council’s 
authorized activities.” Id. § 301(g)(1), 94 Stat. at 2999 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470j(a)(7)). 
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significance to historic properties that may be affected by an 
undertaking. This requirement applies regardless of the location of 
the historic property. Such Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian 
organization shall be a consulting party.92 
Furthermore, agencies are required to ensure that such consultation 
provides an Indian tribe with “reasonable opportunity to identify its 
concerns about historic properties, advise on the identification and 
evaluation of historic properties, including those of traditional religious and 
cultural importance, articulate its views on the undertaking’s effects on 
such properties, and participate in the resolution of adverse effects.”93 The 
regulations further provide that agencies must “make a reasonable and good 
faith effort to identify Indian tribes” that should be consulted and that 
“[c]onsultation should commence early in the planning process, in order to 
identify and discuss relevant preservation issues and resolve concerns about 
the confidentiality of information on historic properties.”94 
1. The Influence of Legislation on Agency Protection of Sacred Sites 
The 1992 NHPA amendments also had an important effect on agency 
interpretation of the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) of 1976.95 
Although no amendments to NFMA forced agencies to reinterpret the Act, 
the experience of enforcing the 1992 NHPA amendments influenced 
agency conceptions of their role with regard to the management of Indian 
sacred sites in other contexts. This voluntary reinterpretation signals a 
striking change in agency attitudes toward sacred sites. 
NFMA itself simply states that the Forest Service must provide for 
“public participation in the planning for and management of the National 
Forest System.”96 Before Lyng, agency regulations required that Indian 
tribes be notified when tribal lands or treaty rights were expected to be 
impacted by Forest Service decisions, and the regulations stated that the 
agency was to “coordinate regional and forest planning with the equivalent 
and related planning efforts of . . . Indian tribes.”97 However, these 
regulations only briefly acknowledged the special concerns of Indian tribes. 
This cursory treatment changed in 2000, as evidenced by the fact that 
Indian concerns were given their own section in the National Forest System 
Land and Resource Management Planning subpart of the Code of Federal 
 
92. 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii) (2004). 
93. Id. § 800.2(c)(2)(ii)(A). 
94. Id. 
95. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 
U.S.C.). 
96. 16 U.S.C. § 1602(b). 
97. 36 C.F.R. § 219.7(a) (1984) (amended 2000). 
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Regulations, entitled “Interaction with American Indian tribes.”98 This 
section now requires the Forest Service to 
consult with and invite American Indian tribes . . . to participate in 
the planning process to assist in: 
(1) The early identification of treaty rights, treaty-protected 
resources, and American Indian tribe trust resources;  
(2) The consideration of tribal data and resource knowledge 
provided by tribal representatives; and  
(3) The consideration of tribal concerns and suggestions 
during decisionmaking.99 
Like NHPA, ARPA was also amended after Lyng. ARPA had already 
required consultation with Indian tribes under the terms of the original 1979 
Act,100 but was amended to include the establishment of “a program to 
increase public awareness of the significance of the archaeological 
resources located on . . . Indian lands and the need to protect such 
resources.”101 
Lastly, RFRA was passed in 1993, in direct response to Smith,102 and 
states that the government can only “substantially burden” the exercise of 
religion when it has relied on the least restrictive means possible to further 
a compelling governmental interest.103 
 
98. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,514, 
67,573 (Nov. 9, 2000) (codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219.15 (2004)). 
99. 36 C.F.R. § 219.15(c). 
100. Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, § 10(a), 93 Stat. 
721, 727 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 470ii(a)) (requiring agencies to promulgate 
regulations under the Act only “after consultation with . . . Indian tribes”). Since the passage of 
the Act, the same section of ARPA also has required agencies to consider the provisions of the 
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, which mandates that 
it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians 
their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions 
of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not 
limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to 
worship through ceremonials and traditional rites. 
42 U.S.C. § 1996. 
101. Amendments to Archeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 100-588, 
§ 1(d), 102 Stat. 2983, 2983 (1988) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 470ii(c)). The amendments 
also originally required land managers to report to Congress on their efforts, id., but this provision 
was repealed by the Omnibus Parks and Public Lands Management Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-333, § 814(d)(2)(A), 110 Stat. 4093, 4196 (partially repealing 16 U.S.C. § 470ii(c) (1994)). 
102. See Todd L. Tisdale, Culture v. Conservation: Does a Proposed Special Regulation 
Threaten the Integrity of the National Park System?, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 111, 130 
(2001). 
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2000). In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that RFRA 
as applied to state governments was an unconstitutional extension of federal power. 521 U.S. 507 
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NHPA, NFMA, and ARPA all have been interpreted to require agency 
consultation with affected tribes. Although these statutes and interpretive 
regulations only mandate discussions with affected tribes and do not force 
agencies to adopt a tribe’s position, they reveal Congress’s intention that 
agencies seriously consider Indian interests in their management decisions. 
Furthermore, although the courts, as demonstrated in Lyng, will not 
mandate agency accommodation, they will enforce the statutory 
consultation provisions as well as agency interpretations of these 
provisions. 
2. The Importance of the Courts in Agency Protection of Sacred Sites 
In Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, the Tenth Circuit held that the 
Forest Service’s requests for specific information about tribal cultural 
activities through form letters and at tribal meetings were not reasonable 
efforts to identify historic properties in the Las Huertas Canyon area as 
required by NHPA.104 According to the court, “[T]he agency did not 
reasonably pursue the information necessary to evaluate the canyon’s 
eligibility for inclusion in the National Register.”105 Because the Sandia 
court found that the “Forest Service’s efforts were neither reasonable nor in 
good faith,”106 the court reversed the district court’s denial of the tribe’s 
request for declarative and injunctive relief and remanded the case. Sandia 
demonstrates that the “teeth” in these statutes is the requirement that 
agencies must listen to Indian concerns. 
More recently, in Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, the 
Ninth Circuit held not only that consultation with affected tribes is required, 
but also that the results of such consultation will be enforced.107 In 
Muckleshoot, the court agreed that before initiating the disputed land 
exchange, the Forest Service had made a “reasonable and good faith effort 
to identify historic properties” as required by NHPA.108 However, the court 
held that since consultation with the tribe had informed the agency of the 
significance of “an important tribal ancestral transportation route,” and had 
convinced the agency of the trail’s importance, the agency was required to 
adequately protect the trail from the possible adverse effects of the land 
 
(1997). Subsequent cases, however, have upheld the Act as applied to the federal government. 
See, e.g., Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001). 
104. 50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995). 
105. Id. at 860. 
106. Id. at 857. 
107. 177 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1999). 
108. Id. at 807. 
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exchange.109 In light of this obligation, the court found the agency’s 
attempts to protect the trail inadequate, enjoined the land exchange, and 
remanded the case with instructions to the Forest Service “to reconsider 
whether it [had] located all of the historic properties on the lands it 
propose[d] to transfer out of federal ownership and what protections should 
be required.”110 As Muckleshoot shows, judicial enforcement does not end 
with statutory consultation requirements: Courts will also enforce those 
regulations that require agencies to act on the information received from 
such consultations. 
One can even see the willingness of courts to enforce agency 
consultation with tribes in cases decided before statutes like NHPA 
specifically addressed the issue. In Attakai v. United States, the Navajo 
Nation brought suit to enjoin the construction of fences and livestock 
watering facilities on the Hopi Indian Reservation.111 The Navajo objected 
because they had not been consulted about the development, despite the fact 
that the lands involved were of historic interest to the tribe.112 The court 
agreed and enjoined the Bureau of Indian Affairs from proceeding with the 
development. The court found that the agency had acted “contrary to the 
letter and spirit of the regulations,” which were promulgated in order to 
include Indian tribes in decisions regarding historic properties.113 The 
regulations stated that, “[w]hen an undertaking may affect properties of 
historic significance to an Indian tribe on non-Indian land,” that tribe must 
have “the opportunity to participate.”114 According to the court, “[T]he 
regulations clearly contemplate[d] participation by Indian tribes regarding 
lands beyond their own reservations.”115 Consequently, the court held that 
the Navajo needed to be given the “opportunity to participate as interested 
persons.”116 
In addition to courts, scholars have also acknowledged the importance 
of consultation between agencies and tribes. Professor Dean Suagee, 
Director of the First Nations Environmental Law Program at Vermont Law 
School, characterized consultation provisions as the “the right to have a seat 
at the table, a chance to persuade the responsible federal official to do the 
right thing.”117 As Suagee recognized, this right is extremely important. By 
 
109. Id. The court cited the then-current regulations and held that the steps the Forest Service 
had taken to mitigate the adverse effects of the exchange did not “ensure preservation of the 
property’s significant historic features.” Id. at 808. 
110. Id. at 815. 
111. 746 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Ariz. 1990). 
112. Id. at 1405. 
113. Id. at 1408. 
114. 36 C.F.R. § 800.1(c)(2)(iii) (1990), quoted in Attakai, 746 F. Supp. at 1408. 
115. Attakai, 746 F. Supp. at 1408. 
116. Id. at 1409. 
117. Dean B. Suagee, Historical Storytelling and the Growth of Tribal Historic Preservation 
Programs, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 86, 88 (2002). 
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guaranteeing that tribes will be able to alert agencies to their concerns, 
these statutes and regulations greatly increase tribes’ ability to influence 
agency decisions. 
Although access to agencies does not guarantee that a tribe will be able 
to influence agency decisions, both agencies and sacred sites supporters 
frequently acknowledge the importance of such consultations. In his article 
Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes, Derek Haskew described the 
competing views of agency consultation and the situations in which 
consultation is most likely to be effective.118 According to Haskew, one 
view of consultations “is that government recognizes the wisdom of 
considering the unique perspectives of Native Americans during policy 
debate, and is making every effort to incorporate those views and interests 
in federal planning.”119 The other view is that the consultation provisions 
“may confuse the real consent of Indian communities to federal actions 
with the procedural illusion of participation, in which Indian consent is 
never really asked for, and advice is never really heeded.”120 After a 
thorough examination of the consultation case law, Haskew concluded that 
both views are correct in certain circumstances, but that consultation can be 
expected to work best in situations where courts can legitimately find that 
“a statutorily created consultation requirement demand[s] something more 
than a consultation rendered meaningless.”121 Therefore, consultation may 
be particularly suited for use in the sacred sites context. According to 
Haskew, sacred sites cases like Sandia show that the combination of a 
statutory consultation provision and the courts’ willingness to enforce it 
ensures that federal agents will not “ignore the information provided” by 
tribes when making their land management decisions.122 
Such judicial willingness to enforce consultation requirements in 
statutes like NHPA ensures that tribes will have a chance to influence 
agency decisions. If necessary, a tribe can bring an agency to court for 
consultation violations. This ability in turn provides an effective check 
against agency abuse of discretion in general and answers one of the 
persistent criticisms of agency decisionmaking, which is that Congress 
 
118. Derek C. Haskew, Federal Consultation with Indian Tribes: The Foundation of 
Enlightened Policy Decisions, or Another Badge of Shame?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 21 (1999-
2000). 
119. Id. at 24. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 71. 
122. Id. at 72. But see id. at 74 (stating that consultation provides the “opportunity for Native 
Americans to express their opinions and desires—with no guarantee that their input will be fully 
considered or even respected”); see also Robert A. Destro, “By What Right?”: The Sources 
and Limits of Federal Court and Congressional Jurisdiction over Matters “Touching Religion,” 
29 IND. L. REV. 1, 30 n.135 (1995) (arguing that “neither the states nor the federal government 
take their respective obligations . . . very seriously . . . . especially if such an obligation would 
interfere with agency discretion”). 
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cannot closely monitor every agency decision. As critics rightly note, 
Congress must rely on external groups to alert it to agency abuses, and 
“[o]nly when they hear such an alarm will members of Congress turn their 
attention to the problem.”123 However, cases such as Sandia provide the 
necessary alarm; they make agency abuses more visible and help alert 
Congress to these problems. 
The consultation provisions in statutes like the NHPA and courts’ 
proven willingness to enforce them have increased the feasibility of 
informing Congress of agency abuses. In his testimony before Congress, 
William Day, Chairman of the Culture and Heritage Committee of the 
United South and Eastern Tribes, Inc., alerted Congress to instances of 
agency abuse by citing Sandia and similar cases and comparing the facts of 
those cases to the FCC’s current failure to consult with tribal governments 
before constructing cell phone towers on Indian sacred lands. Day used 
these cases to demonstrate his belief that the “FCC has been unwilling to 
live up to its consultation obligations both under the National Historic 
Preservation Act and the Trust Responsibility to Tribes,” and that 
congressional oversight was needed to curb these abuses.124 
3. The Importance of Environmental Groups 
The effectiveness of consultation may also be strengthened by the 
support of environmental groups for tribal efforts to protect sacred sites. 
These groups have both the experience and financial resources to enable 
them to negotiate effectively with agencies and, when necessary, to bring 
abuses of agency discretion to Congress’s attention. For example, in 
Sandia, the Pueblo of Sandia was joined by the Sandoval Environmental 
Action Community, Earth First!, the Sandia Mountain Wildlife and 
Conservation Club, the Sierra Club, and Wildlife Rescue of New Mexico in 
bringing an action for declaratory and injunctive relief.125 The added 
resources and expertise of groups such as these improve the effectiveness of 
both tribal consultation with agencies and litigation to enforce consultation 
provisions.126 As a result, the combination of the statutes’ consultation 
 
123. Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 
50 DUKE L.J. 1277, 1298 (2001). 
124. Telecom Carriers, Tribal Government, and the Siting of Communications Towers: 
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs & the Communications Subcomm. of the 
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 107th Cong. (2002), 2002 WL 20317157 (statement 
of William Day, Chairman, Culture and Heritage Committee, United South and Eastern Tribes, 
Inc.). 
125. Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856, 856 (10th Cir. 1995). 
126. The importance of the aid provided by these environmental groups may also be gleaned 
from cases in which these groups have argued against tribes, most notably cases concerning 
traditional tribal uses of endangered animals. In these cases, tribes have frequently lost the right to 
use these animals even when they were shown to be an integral part of the Indian tribes’ religion 
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provisions, the courts’ willingness to enforce them, and the desire of 
outside groups to use their resources and expertise to bring abuses to the 
courts’ and Congress’s attention has ensured that the right to consultation 
with agencies is a meaningful one. 
4. Executive Influence on the Protection of Sacred Sites 
In addition, President Clinton shared Congress’s concern regarding the 
protection of Indian culture and sacred sites in the wake of Lyng, and in 
1996 he issued Executive Order 13,007, providing that federal agencies 
“(1) accommodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by 
Indian religious practitioners and (2) avoid adversely affecting the physical 
integrity of such sacred sites.”127 Like the congressional statutes, Executive 
Order 13,007 may not create onerous legal duties,128 but together the 
statutes and the Order send a clear message to land management agencies 
that it is their role to accommodate Indian religious practices and protect 
sacred sites. To the surprise of many, the agencies have listened. 
B. The Effectiveness of Consultation Provisions 
The management plan the Park Service created for Rainbow Bridge 
National Monument provides a good example of the influence of statutory 
provisions requiring accommodation or consultation. The Park Service 
issued its management plan for Rainbow Bridge in direct response to 
Executive Order 13,007 and cited the Order in deciding that Rainbow 
Bridge was eligible for listing as a national historic place. The agency’s 
eligibility determination was based on criteria very similar to the 
requirements of Executive Order 13,007.129 Furthermore, in Natural Arch & 
 
and culture. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986) (finding congressional intent in 
the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act to abrogate Indian treaty rights to hunt eagles); United 
States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that burdens on Native American religion 
imposed by the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act were warranted, as the Act served a 
compelling government interest); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(upholding tribal whaling rights but with significant limitations); United States v. Billie, 667 F. 
Supp. 1485, 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that the Endangered Species Act abrogated Indian 
treaty rights to hunt the endangered Florida panther). 
127. 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771, 26,771 (May 29, 1996). 
128. See Bonham, supra note 8, at 172 (“The Order, however, incorporates qualifying 
language that limits federal land management agency implementation of the objectives to 
situations where it is ‘not clearly inconsistent with essential agency functions’ and only ‘to the 
extent practicable.’ Executive Order 13,007, therefore, is largely a hortatory and aspirational 
expression of government policy.” (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. at 26,771)); 
Tisdale, supra note 102, at 132-33 (“While these statements by the past Administration 
established a general policy approach for departments and agencies in the Executive Branch, they 
do not carry the force of law; nor can they override existing laws.”). 
129. The reviewing court commented on this connection by first describing the 1996 
Executive Order and then stating: 
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Bridge Society v. Alston, the case that resulted from the controversy over 
this management plan, the Park Service recognized it had a duty to consider 
Indian interests in its management plans, regardless of whether or not it 
actually had a legal obligation to do anything more than hear them.130 
Legislation such as the 1992 NHPA amendments, regulations such as those 
implementing NFMA, and Executive Order 13,007 appear to have given the 
Park Service and other land agencies this new conception of their role. Not 
only are land agencies becoming more willing to accommodate and protect 
Indian sacred sites, but the protection they are providing can often be quite 
effective. In fact, in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, it was only 
because the Park Service wanted to implement strong protection for Bear 
Lodge that the agency found itself involved in a lawsuit.131 
C. The Legality of Agency Accommodation 
Suits such as Bear Lodge, brought by non-Indian groups who believe 
that agency accommodation has gone too far, show that the dismissive 
attitude expressed by many toward agency accommodation has been 
undeserved. Increasingly, agencies are now under fire because of their 
willingness to consider Indian interests in the sites they manage. Although 
Lyng stated that agency accommodation was desirable, as soon as agencies 
began to accommodate Indian religious practices and protect sacred sites, 
they were once again faced with First Amendment challenges—this time 
from those who argued that accommodations represented the impermissible 
establishment of Indian religion over all others.132 Thus far, such suits have 
proved unsuccessful. 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment prohibits Congress 
from making laws “respecting an establishment of religion.” However, the 
Supreme Court has also made it clear that the Establishment Clause does 
not require “‘callous indifference’” to religion.133 Although the Constitution 
prohibits the endorsement of religion, it also “affirmatively mandates 
accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions.”134 
 
Interestingly, in the early 1990s, the National Park Service requested that the Utah State 
Historic Preservation Officer (“USHPO”) make a determination of eligibility of 
Rainbow Bridge for the National Register of Historic Places as a site that has cultural 
significance based on its traditional and sacred values to Native Americans. 
Natural Arch & Bridge Soc’y v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1226 n.11 (D. Utah 2002), aff’d, 
No. 02-4099, 2004 WL 569888 (10th Cir. Mar. 23, 2004) (unpublished decision). The court then 
juxtaposed this decision with the requirements of Executive Order 13,007. Id. 
130. Id. at 1225-26. 
131. 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999). 
132. See Bonham, supra note 8, at 166. 
133. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 
314 (1952)). 
134. Id. 
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The meaning of the Establishment Clause is hotly contested. If the 
Constitution mandates separation between government and religion, then 
any accommodation of religion by the government would seem to violate 
the First Amendment. This is the view of strict separationists. They believe 
that any governmental accommodation is impermissible, and they base their 
interpretation of the Establishment Clause on statements of Founding 
Fathers, such as Thomas Jefferson, who demanded “‘the total separation of 
the anciently meshed powers of church and state.’”135 
Others interpret the Establishment Clause as requiring accommodation. 
Accomodationists reconcile the prohibition against religious establishment 
by differentiating between types of accommodation. For them, 
The key difference between legitimate accommodation and 
impermissible “establishment” is that the former merely removes 
obstacles to the exercise of a religious conviction adopted for 
reasons independent of the government’s action, while the latter 
creates an incentive or inducement (in the strong form, a 
compulsion) to adopt that practice or conviction.136 
The question for accommodationists is thus whether a given 
accommodation simply removes obstacles to religious observance or 
actively encourages such observance. 
The Establishment Clause issue is further complicated by the fact that, 
in other contexts, constitutional provisions have been held to apply 
differently to Indians because of the special relationship between Indian 
tribes and the U.S. government. This special relationship gives Congress 
the authority to develop exemptions and preferences for Indians that might 
otherwise be unconstitutional. In Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court 
held that “[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the 
fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians, such 
legislative judgments will not be disturbed.”137 Based on this special 
relationship, Congress has the authority to provide special protections for 
Indians that might otherwise violate the Establishment Clause, and thus 
agency accommodation of Indian religious practices is less likely raise 
constitutional concerns than the same accommodation for other religious 
groups. 
 
135. Robert L. Cord & Howard Ball, The Separation of Church and State: A Debate, 1987 
UTAH L. REV. 895, 913 (quoting FAWN M. BRODIE, THOMAS JEFFERSON: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 
129 (1974)). 
136. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the 
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992). 
137. 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974) (holding that the hiring policy of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
which gave preference to American Indians, was not a racial preference, but instead was a 
preference based on membership in a quasi-sovereign group that has a special relationship with 
the United States). 
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In other situations, the federal-tribal relationship has been used 
successfully to defend statutory exemptions against Establishment Clause 
challenges.138 A number of current federal statutes reflect this intuition. For 
example, “members of the Native American Church (Indians who use 
peyote as a sacrament) are exempt from criminal penalties for the 
possession of peyote.”139 Similarly, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection 
Act prohibits the possession of eagles or eagle parts, but authorizes the 
Secretary of the Interior to make an exception for Indian religious purposes 
under certain circumstances.140 Therefore, even if federal accommodation 
of Indian sacred sites would violate the Establishment Clause under normal 
circumstances, exceptions for Indians are likely constitutional. 
1. The Conflict over the Management of Bear Lodge/Devils Tower 
Devils Tower National Monument, known to Indians as Bear Lodge, is 
located in northeastern Wyoming and is a natural phenomenon with great 
historical and religious significance. President Roosevelt dedicated the 
tower in 1906 as the first national monument.141 Thousands of visitors come 
each year to view the monument, and some come to climb it, since Devils 
Tower is considered one of the best rock-climbing locations in the world.142 
For many Indian tribes, however, Devils Tower is a sacred site. According 
to religious legend, seven sisters took refuge from a pursuing bear at the 
tower. There they prayed for the rock’s aid, the rock began to grow, and 
when it reached the sky, the girls turned into the seven stars of the Big 
Dipper.143 
These different meanings, one recreational and the other religious, have 
led to conflict over the management of the tower. Many visitors come 
hundreds or thousands of miles to climb the tower, but Indian tribes view 
such climbing as sacrilege and want it to stop. Sensitive to these conflicting 
concerns, the Park Service attempted to devise a land management plan that 
could accommodate the varying interests. The Park Service initiated and 
completed a collaborative process that involved both groups, climbers and 
tribes. After much time and thought, the Service implemented a plan it 
hoped would be acceptable to all users of the site. The Park Service’s plan 
called for a voluntary ban on all climbing during the month of June, the 
 
138. See Brent Gunson, Cultural Tug of Wars: An Analysis of the Legal Issues Involving the 
NPS Proposed Rule To Allow the Taking of Golden Eagles at Wupatki National Monument for 
Religious Purposes, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 399, 416-17 (2002). 
139. Lydia T. Grimm, Sacred Lands and the Establishment Clause: Indian Religious 
Practices on Federal Lands, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 19, 23 (1997). 
140. Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act § 1, 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2000). 
141. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 819 (10th Cir. 1999). 
142. Brady, supra note 6, at 166. 
143. Bonham, supra note 8, at 158. 
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peak month for Indian religious ceremonies at the tower, but permitted 
climbing throughout the rest of the year.144 The plan also prohibited 
climbers from adding new bolts and fixed pitons, or new routes needing 
either, and it required camouflaged climbing equipment.145 
Most of the climbing community accepted the voluntary ban, but a 
small group of mostly commercial climbing outfits challenged it as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause.146 The district court upheld the 
voluntary ban147 as “a legitimate exercise of the Secretary of the Interior’s 
discretion in managing the Monument.”148 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit 
upheld the district court’s decision on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing.149 The key aspect for both courts was the voluntary nature of the 
ban.150 
Bear Lodge—and the other cases discussed below—demonstrate that 
agencies are not only willing to make serious efforts to accommodate 
Indian interests at sacred sites, but also that these accommodations will be 
upheld by the courts. Although the ban was voluntary and hence lacked 
formal enforcement measures, it was highly respected and effective.151 
Tribal members have strongly approved of it. Charlotte Black Elk, who 
lives on the Pine Ridge Reservation, indicated that reducing the number of 
climbers on the tower, especially during the June ceremonies, created “a 
more suitable atmosphere for prayer,” stating that “[b]efore the current June 
arrangement, we had people looking over the tower at us, (which was) 
distracting.”152 Similarly, Elaine Quiver, a Lakota Sioux who also lives on 
the Pine Ridge Reservation, said that “the voluntary closure is a good 
compromise that allows climbers and Native Americans to both use [Bear 
Lodge]. She said the ceremonies performed in the monument have served to 
heal Lakota culture, which she said has been overrun by modern American 
culture.”153 
 
144. See Brady, supra note 6, at 168. 
145. See Bonham, supra note 8, at 182. 
146. Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public 
Lands, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 459 (2002). The plaintiffs challenged the law in part because 
they worried the Park Service would make the ban mandatory if the voluntary ban did not have 
the desired effect. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 820. 
147. The original plan also banned commercial permits during June, but that aspect was 
eliminated when it appeared the court would strike it down. See Bonham, supra note 8, at 183-84. 
148. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1457 (D. Wyo. 1998), 
aff’d, 175 F.3d 814. 
149. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d 814. 
150. See id. at 821-22; Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1455-56. 
151. Two years after the voluntary ban was enacted, the number of climbers at Devils Tower 
during the month of June had decreased from 1294 to 193. Karen J. Coates, Stairway to Heaven; 
When a Climbing Mecca Is Also a Sacred Site, SIERRA, Nov./Dec. 1996, at 27, 28. 
152. Jim Hughes, Devils Tower a Monument to Clash of Cultures; Indians Resent Climbers 
at Site Shrouded in Myth, DENVER POST, July 5, 1998, at B5 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
153. Jim Hughes, Devils Tower Deal Resolves Dispute; Most Climbers Heed Voluntary June 
Ban, DENVER POST, July 13, 1997, at B3, 1997 WL 6079166. 
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2. Further First Amendment Challenges 
Cases after Bear Lodge have confirmed agency willingness to 
accommodate tribal concerns, the effectiveness of this accommodation, and 
courts’ readiness to uphold such accommodation. Shortly after the Tenth 
Circuit’s decision in Bear Lodge, similar litigation was brought against the 
National Park Service in Natural Arch & Bridge Society v. Alston.154 
Plaintiffs challenged the Park Service’s policy of informing tourists of the 
sacredness of Rainbow Bridge to local tribes and asking them not to walk 
under it. Natural Arch & Bridge Society is especially interesting given the 
fact that twenty years earlier, in Badoni v. Higginson,155 the Park Service 
had been taken to court because of its callous indifference to the religious 
significance of Rainbow Bridge. Now it was being sued for providing too 
much accommodation. Few cases demonstrate a more dramatic change in 
agency policy. In Natural Arch & Bridge Society, the plaintiffs argued that 
the accommodation, which included erecting barriers and posting signs 
requesting visitors not to walk under the bridge, went too far. Although the 
case was dismissed for failure to properly join defendants, the court made it 
clear that had it reached the merits, the accommodation would have been 
upheld.156 
Courts have also upheld agency decisions to accommodate Indian 
sacred sites in situations quite different from these voluntary ban cases. A 
recent example is Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 
in which a timber company challenged both the adoption of a historic 
preservation plan for the Medicine Wheel National Historic Landmark by 
the Forest Service as well as the Forest Service’s decision to withdraw a 
timber sale.157 The Medicine Wheel is a prehistoric circular structure of 
rocks located in Big Horn National Forest in north-central Wyoming, and is 
considered sacred by numerous Indian tribes.158 The Medicine Wheel was 
designated a national historic landmark in 1969, but by the late 1980s the 
increasing numbers of visitors to the Medicine Wheel convinced the Forest 
Service that it needed to implement a management plan to better protect the 
site.159 
After much consultation with affected parties, the Forest Service 
adopted a management plan within the framework of its obligations under 
the National Historic Preservation Act.160 The Forest Service’s decision was 
 
154. 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002), aff’d, No. 02-4099, 2004 WL 569888 (10th Cir. 
Mar. 23, 2004) (unpublished decision). 
155. 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980). 
156. Natural Arch & Bridge Soc’y, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1223-26. 
157. 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Wyo. 2001). 
158. Id. at 1286. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 1287. 
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also guided by other laws, such as the Antiquities Act of 1906;161 the 
Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act of 1935;162 the American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978;163 ARPA;164 and Executive Order 
13,007.165 In order to comply with its management plan, the Forest Service 
cancelled a proposed sale of timber because of concerns that the sale would 
adversely impact the Medicine Wheel site.166 The plaintiff in Wyoming 
Sawmills challenged this decision, alleging that the Forest Service plan 
“wrongfully promote[d] religion in violation of the establishment clause 
because promoting the Indian religion was a motivating factor behind [the 
Forest Service’s] decision to enact the [preservation plan].”167 
The court disagreed, once again holding that agency accommodation of 
Indian sacred sites does not violate the Establishment Clause. The plaintiff 
claimed that the Forest Service regulation prevented it from freely using 
public areas and that it was offended by the religious symbolism that the 
regulation advanced.168 However, the court found that the plan did not 
advance any religious symbolism: “Unlike the cases Sawmills cited, the 
[preservation plan] did not erect any religious symbol anywhere in Big 
Horn National Forest.”169 In addition, the court questioned whether a “for 
profit corporation has the capacity to be offended.”170 As a result, the court 
held that Sawmills lacked the “necessary elements of an injury” to establish 
standing.171 The court also found that even if Sawmills’s injuries were 
sufficient for standing, the elements of causation and redressability were 
 
161. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (2000). The Act authorizes the President “in his discretion, to 
declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other 
objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by the 
Government of the United States to be national monuments.” Id. § 431. 
162. Id. §§ 461-467. For a discussion of the Act, see Joe P. Yeager, Federal Preservation 
Laws: Sites, Structures & Objects, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 383 (2002). As Yeager writes, 
Although the Historic Sites Act of 1935 provided the Secretary of the Interior with the 
authority to set up programs for landmark preservation, such as the National Historic 
Landmark Program, the Act has been attacked for a failure to clarify what procedures 
govern how a historic property is acquired and designated as a historic landmark. The 
Historic Sites Act has also been criticized for its failure to integrate historic 
preservation concerns into federal agency departments, which would arguably provide 
for better management and enforcement. Nevertheless, the Act remains in force at 
present, though clearly overshadowed and outdated . . . [by] the National Historic 
Preservation Act. 
Id. at 389-90 (footnotes omitted). 
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1996. 
164. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-470mm. 
165. 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 29, 1996). 
166. Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1289 (D. Wyo. 2001). 
167. Id. at 1290. 
168. Id. at 1293 (“[The company] claims that it has suffered an injury because it has come in 
direct contact with unwelcomed religious symbolism endorsed by the United States.”). 
169. Id. at 1294. 
170. Id. at 1295. 
171. Id. at 1294. 
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not satisfied.172 It made clear that, even if it was the Medicine Wheel itself 
that offended Sawmills, the court “could not redress that injury because 
striking down the [preservation plan] would not do away with the Medicine 
Wheel.”173 In the two claims for which the court found standing, the court 
upheld the agency accommodation. Once again, in a situation in which a 
land agency had made the determination to protect a sacred site and had 
done so in conformance with what it believed were its regulatory and 
statutory obligations, the court found the accommodation constitutional.174 
D. Why Agency Accommodation Is a Permanent Change 
While these cases demonstrate that agency accommodation has 
increased in recent years, much of this accommodation occurred under the 
Clinton Administration, which was highly receptive to sacred sites 
protection. One of the concerns with agency accommodation for sacred 
sites, as opposed to statutory or judicial protection, is its potential 
susceptibility to change across administrations. Many question whether 
agencies will protect sacred sites under presidents who are less sympathetic 
to Indian interests.175 Although it is still too soon to tell, changes in 
administration do not appear to have greatly affected the recent trend 
toward greater sacred sites protection, in part because of the numerous acts 
requiring agency consultation with affected tribes and the courts’ 
willingness to enforce these requirements. The procedural rights guaranteed 
in these statutes have been turned into significant protections by tribes and 
other sacred sites supporters who, in exercising these rights, have changed 
the way in which land management decisions are made. 
The commitment to agency accommodation is demonstrated by the fact 
that the change in administrations has not dampened efforts to seek out 
tribal opinions. For example, the Army Corps of Engineers was recently 
told by the federal Advisory Council on Historic Preservation that it has a 
duty to protect Indian graves and sacred sites when conducting dam and 
 
172. Id. at 1296-97. 
173. Id. at 1295. 
174. In this case, the Forest Service even consulted with Sawmills and gave it the opportunity 
to participate in the planning process. For example, the Forest Service gave Sawmills “a draft of 
the proposed vegetation and timber management sections of the proposed [preservation plan] to 
review” and asked Sawmills “to participate and attend future information sharing meetings.” Id. at 
1303-04 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
175. See, e.g., Mandosa, supra note 58, at 110 (arguing that “[w]ith the new Republican 
administration in the 1980’s, a climate more favorable to business interests prevailed, and the 
government ceased promoting Indian religious freedoms, which often conflicted with economic 
goals”); see also Sandi B. Zellmer, Indian Lands as Critical Habitat for Indian Nations and 
Endangered Species: Tribal Survival and Sovereignty Come First, 43 S.D. L. REV. 381, 410 n.167 
(1998) (stating that “it is not uncommon for executive orders [directed at agencies] to be short 
lived” because of “a subsequent change in administration or administrative policy”). 
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river operations.176 In response to this advice, the Corps promised to 
incorporate the obligation to protect Indian sacred sites into its new master 
manual governing all river operations. Such a decision shows that the Corps 
considers the protection of sacred sites to be a permanent obligation. The 
Corps “seem[s] more ready to listen and work with you than ever before,” 
said Tony Provost, environmental director of the Omaha tribe in 
Nebraska.177 
Other agencies have also made changes that will have similar impacts 
well into the future. As tribes have made a greater effort to inform land 
management agencies about their sacred sites, agencies have become more 
willing to incorporate this information into their future plans. For instance, 
as a result of agency identification of sacred sites and consultation with 
Indian tribes, the Six Rivers National Forest (the location of the proposed 
road at the core of the Lyng controversy) now has a management plan 
providing a buffer zone around the sacred site in order to “minimize 
potential conflict with other uses, and to preserve the ceremonial values of 
the areas.”178 Such management plans have an obvious influence on future 
land management decisions, making it less likely that agency decisions will 
vary significantly with changes in administration. 
However, the greatest indication of permanent change may be the 
increased willingness of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the 
agency most frequently blamed for indifference toward and destruction of 
Indian Sacred Sites,179 to consider Indian interests in its land management 
decisions. Two recent decisions illustrate this point. 
In February 2001, the BLM granted Anschutz Exploration Corporation 
a permit to drill an exploratory well in Weatherman Draw, Montana, an 
area identified by several Indian tribes as having religious significance. At 
the time the permit was granted, the BLM had determined that the well 
would cause no significant impact on any Indian sacred sites. In response to 
this decision, several tribes filed requests for state director review. These 
requests were granted and oral presentations were made to the agency. 
Although further review upheld the permit, additional constraints were 
added on top of its original restrictions, which had already included 
prohibitions on any activity “during the periods of April 15 to May 16 and 
September 15 to October 15 when the area is used for Native American 
 
176. Bill Lambrecht, Talks About Sacred Sites Go Well, Say Corps, Tribes; Indians Describe 
Grief at Looting and Erosion Along Missouri River, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 3, 2003, 
at A1. 
177. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
178. Grimm, supra note 139, at 24. 
179. See, e.g., Native American Sacred Places: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 108th Cong. 57 (2003) (statement of Suzan Shown Harjo, President, The Morning Star 
Institute) (singling out the BLM as having a “record of permitting desecration and destruction of 
sacred places”). 
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religious ceremonies.”180 The agency also added the requirement that “an 
archeologist . . . be on site whenever soil is disturbed, and oil field workers 
will not be allowed into areas with archeological sites,” and the assurance 
that “[t]he well would be a quarter-mile from the nearest eligible cultural 
site.”181 
Such provisions and restrictions show a continuing awareness and 
concern for Indian sacred sites. In addition, the Anschutz case also 
demonstrates the power of consultation. After the permit was upheld, the 
BLM agreed to further consultations with the affected tribes. A meeting 
was arranged between the BLM, the tribes, and Anschutz in which “the 
parties agreed to meet again to work on a negotiated resolution of the 
matter.”182 This meeting was only the first of many in which Anschutz, the 
BLM, and the tribes worked together to reach a compromise regarding the 
future of these lands. In April 2002, after numerous meetings, Anschutz 
made an unprecedented move and decided to donate its drilling leases to the 
National Trust for Historic Preservation.183 According to Lillian Sparks, a 
legislative associate with the National Congress of American Indians, this 
decision showed “the beginning of understanding and the kind of 
cooperation that can take place between miners and some of our native 
people.”184 Similarly, Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton described the 
decision as an example of “the successes we are achieving through the 
process of consultation, cooperation and communication.”185 
The Anschultz decision may not reflect the typical result of 
consultations between tribes and permit holders, but it does show both the 
power that consultations can have and the increased willingness on the part 
of the BLM to encourage these types of negotiations. Although some critics 
saw the granting of the permit as an indication of a concerning change in 
administrative policy toward sacred sites,186 on closer examination, the 
BLM’s decision actually reflected a continuation of the increased 
awareness and concern for Indian sacred sites that had begun under the 
Clinton Administration.187 
 
180. Press Release, Bureau of Land Management, Weatherman Draw Oil and Gas 
Exploration 1 (Dec. 20, 2001), http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/mt/2002/ib/02mtb029_at17.wpd. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. April Reese, Company Drops Plans To Drill in Montana Valley Held Sacred by Tribes, 
LAND LETTER, May 2, 2002, at http://www.eenews.net/subscriber/search/swishe-search.cgi 
(providing a search form to archived materials). 
184. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
185. Geoffrey Mohan, Mogul Keeps Tribal Site Sacred; Anschutz’s Company Rules Out 
Drilling for Oil in a Montana Canyon Graced with Ancient Indian Art, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 24, 
2002, at A10 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
186. E.g., Kraker, supra note 12, at 12 (noting that the permit was granted “12 days after 
[George W. Bush] took office”). 
187. In fact, the Clinton Administration conducted the environmental assessment upon which 
the permit was granted. See Press Release, supra note 180, at 2. 
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A similar example of the BLM’s continued willingness to consider 
Indian concerns in its land management decisions can be seen in the BLM’s 
decision to deny the Dacotah Cement Land Exchange Proposal. Dacotah 
first approached the BLM with a land exchange proposal in 1997, at which 
time it was told that such an exchange was possible but that there might be 
cultural concerns.188 A cultural inventory subsequently identified numerous 
sites of potential cultural significance to tribes in the region. In spite of 
these findings, in September 2001, Dacotah indicated that it still wished to 
proceed with the land exchange. Given the potential impact on Indian 
sacred sites, however, the BLM refused. In fact, the BLM stated that “if the 
extent of cultural resources had been known earlier, BLM would probably 
not have entertained this exchange.”189 
The BLM’s decision to refuse the exchange was based on a concern for 
the preservation of Indian sacred sites. The BLM held repeated meetings 
with affected tribes to discuss the potential impact of the exchange. These 
meetings enabled the tribes to voice their opposition to the exchange and 
explain the religious and cultural significance of the lands.190 As a result, 
the BLM refused the proposal, even when facing pressure from the 
Governor of South Dakota to approve the land exchange.191 
Although the above examples are instances in which agencies have 
continued to protect sacred sites despite a change in administration, there 
are exceptions. In situations in which a previous administration has 
significantly pushed the outer limits of agency accommodation, an 
incoming administration may consider scaling back some of the most 
unprecedented decisions, and there have been instances of this trend under 
the Bush Administration. An obvious example is the Glamis Gold decision. 
In January 2001, after a six-year permit process, the BLM made an 
unprecedented choice:192 Outgoing Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt 
 
188. Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua (GCC), the successor to the South Dakota state-owned 
Dacotah Cement, offered to exchange its 3000-acre Hoffman Ranch to BLM for 2320 acres of 
public lands with minerals and an additional 3620 acres of federal mineral estate on other GCC-
owned land. The exchange would have provided GCC with an estimated 200-year limestone 
supply. Press Release, Bureau of Land Management, Dacotah Cement Land Exchange Proposal 1 
(Jan. 3, 2002), http://www.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/mt/2002/ib/02mtb061_at8.wpd. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. See id. 
192. See Christine Knight, Comment, A Regulatory Minefield: Can the Department of 
Interior Say “No” to a Hardrock Mine?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 621 (2002). According to 
Knight: 
[T]he Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) . . . explicitly 
granted the Department of the Interior the organic authority to manage the federal 
public lands, including those containing mining claims located under the Hardrock Act. 
While noting that the rights conveyed by the Hardrock Act remained otherwise intact, 
FLPMA imposed the following mandate upon the Secretary of the Interior: “In 
managing the public lands the Secretary shall, by regulation or otherwise, take any 
action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands” . . . . 
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denied Glamis a mining permit because of concerns over potential “cultural 
impacts.”193 This was the first time a mining permit had ever been denied 
for such reasons.194 Ten months later, Secretary Norton rescinded Babbitt’s 
denial and allowed the permitting process to begin all over again.195 
Norton’s decision was based on the Department of the Interior’s 
determination that regulations requiring the consideration of “cultural 
impacts” were inconsistent with the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act (FLPMA) of 1976, which gives the BLM the authority to regulate 
public lands,196 and such regulations were thus an insufficient basis upon 
which to deny a mine permit.197 These events concerning the Glamis mine 
permit demonstrate the reversals that may occur when a subsequent 
administration believes an earlier administration has gone too far. 
In the Glamis case, it is highly likely that the change in administration 
did influence the Department of the Interior’s decision to reconsider 
Glamis’s permit request. However, Glamis was a unique case. It was an 
example of an agency bending over backwards to accommodate Indian 
interests. Secretary Babbitt’s decision to deny the mining permit was both 
controversial and unprecedented. Not only was the mine denied in the final 
days of the Clinton Administration, but it was also the first time a mining 
permit had ever been denied based on the interpretation that the 
“‘unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands’”198 provision of FLPMA 
applied to the “‘cultural . . . resource values of the public lands.’”199 This 
interpretation was quite controversial because “for over one hundred years, 
the right to mine on public land had been unquestioned.”200 
Therefore, although the change to a more conservative administration is 
likely to reverse some of the most radical instances of agency 
accommodation, as in Glamis, most instances of agency accommodation do 
not fall into this category. If an agency decides to accommodate Indian 
sacred sites under one administration, it appears more likely than not that 
 
Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (2000) (emphasis added)). In 2001, the BLM enacted revised 
mining regulations that imposed even more stringent standards by granting the Department of the 
Interior the right to deny a mining permit where “substantial, irreparable harm to significant 
scientific, cultural, or environmental resource values of the public lands” would result, and could 
not be “effectively mitigated.” 43 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2001), quoted in Knight, supra, at 622-23. 
It was under this provision that the BLM denied the Glamis mine permit. 
193. Kraker, supra note 12, at 14. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1785. 
197. See Tom Kenworthy, New Mining Rules Reverse Provisions, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 
2001, at 8A; see also Press Release, Bureau of Land Management, BLM To Retain Key Hardrock 
Mining Rule Provision (Oct. 25, 2001), http://www.nv.blm.gov/News.Releases/Press_Releases/ 
fy2002/PR0204.htm. 
198. Knight, supra note 192, at 621 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b)). 
199. Id. at 622-23 (quoting 43 C.F.R. § 3809.5 (2001)). 
200. Id. at 623. 
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this accommodation will continue through subsequent administrations as 
well. As critics rightly point out, agency decisions are easier to reverse than 
court decisions or legislation, but as discussed in the next Part, this 
flexibility makes agency protection preferable to First Amendment 
protection or a comprehensive sacred sites statute. 
III.  THE BENEFITS OF AGENCY ACCOMMODATION 
VERSUS BROADER FORMS OF PROTECTION 
A. The Unique Protection Afforded by Agencies 
Although critics are right when they argue that a Supreme Court 
decision or a comprehensive sacred sites statute would offer broader 
protection for sacred sites, they are wrong when they argue that such an 
approach would be preferable. As demonstrated above, the broad judicial 
and legislative methods of protection advocated by most sacred sites 
supporters are not the only ways to protect these sites. Tribes prefer such 
methods because they are more likely to provide sweeping protection for all 
sacred sites in all circumstances. Judicial and legislative methods of 
protection would necessarily have to be extremely broad because the courts 
and Congress are both ill-equipped to make potentially thousands of 
detailed, individualized determinations as to whether and how a particular 
site should be protected. This means that such protections would be grossly 
overinclusive if made by the courts or Congress, preventing the use of lands 
that the majority of society would want to be developed. In contrast, such 
overinclusiveness is not a problem for agencies, which can adopt quite 
specific protection plans. Furthermore, site-specific protection by agencies, 
although narrower, is likely to satisfy more people than the type of broad 
protection that would result from a Supreme Court opinion or congressional 
statute. 
Because agencies are already managing many of these sites, giving 
agencies the power to make the rules that they will be enforcing increases 
the likelihood that these rules will be a better fit with the agency, the 
monument, and all those using the land than would rules resulting from 
court opinions or broad legislative provisions. In Bear Lodge, the Park 
Service spent years developing a management plan that took all competing 
concerns into consideration and attempted to create a solution acceptable to 
all interested parties. The result was extremely site-specific—much of it 
concerned climbing and the specific effects of climbing on Devils Tower—
and would not have been appropriate for most or even many other sacred 
sites. If individual agencies make the rules that they are going to have to 
enforce, these rules will fit better with the protected area, and the land 
agencies will be better equipped to enforce them. 
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Another example of how agency-devised regulations are more easily 
tailored to specific sites than those promulgated by the courts or Congress 
can be seen in the management plan governing Rainbow Bridge National 
Monument. At Rainbow Bridge, park rangers enforce the voluntary ban on 
walking under the monument by informing visitors of the sacredness of the 
site and explaining why they might not want to walk under it.201 Such a 
regulation tries to accommodate all users of the site, even though it might 
not be what either group would have chosen on its own. However, this is 
the type of regulation that could only be devised by an agency intimately 
familiar with the site it is regulating. 
Leaving decisionmaking in the hands of the agencies administering the 
sites also creates fairer, more balanced decisions. Agencies are likely to be 
more familiar with the land dispute than either the courts or Congress, and 
they will consequently have a better sense of the possible compromises that 
can be reached. For instance, the agency decision regarding Zuni Salt Lake 
shows how agencies can create an acceptable compromise even when the 
solution they propose is different from the ones initially requested by the 
parties. The Zuni Salt Lake and the area around it are sacred to the Zuni and 
other Pueblo tribes.202 In May 2002, the Department of the Interior gave the 
Salt River Project permission to begin work on a mine in the area that 
would have required 4000 acre-feet of water per year from local aquifers in 
order to work.203 The Zuni feared this pumping would drain their lake and 
wanted it stopped. Sensitive to the concerns of both groups, the Department 
came up with a compromise that allowed the construction of the mine to 
proceed, but also protected the lake. The Department imposed a number of 
restrictions on the mining project, including an absolute prohibition on any 
pumping from the Dakota Aquifer, the aquifer most vital to the lake’s 
survival.204 The plan also required the “Salt River Project to consult with 
Indian tribes to develop cultural awareness programs for mine employees 
and contractors.”205 This compromise is the type of solution that could only 
be devised by an agency; it will allow the mine to be built, bringing 
hundreds of jobs to the area, but it will not destroy the Zuni Salt Lake.206 
Agency accommodation also creates an alternative to the traditional 
liability and property rules that courts usually choose between when making 
land-use determinations. In many of these sacred sites cases, neither a 
property nor a liability rule would create an acceptable solution to the 
 
201. Bonham, supra note 8, at 190. 
202. See Winona Laduke, The Salt Woman and the Coal Mine, SIERRA, Nov./Dec. 2002, 
at 44, 46. 
203. Kraker, supra note 12, at 13. 
204. Id. 
205. Leslie Linthicum, Zunis Seek Help in Mine Fight, ALBUQUERQUE J., July 17, 2002, 
at B3. 
206. Id. 
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problem. For example, in the Zuni Salt Lake case, if the Zuni had been 
given a property rule they would have simply prohibited the construction of 
the mine, regardless of the most efficient outcome: Unlike most property 
use situations, religious sites are less susceptible to bargaining, even if a 
compromise would benefit both parties. A liability rule requiring the Salt 
River Project to compensate the tribe for the destruction of the site would 
be similarly undesirable, given the difficulty of placing monetary value on a 
sacred site. If the construction of the mine destroyed the Zuni Salt Lake, no 
amount of money could adequately compensate the Zuni Pueblo for their 
loss. Accordingly, agency accommodation, which is able to take religious 
value into account in a way that a strict property- or liability-rule regime 
cannot, seems ideally suited for these types of land disputes. Agency 
decisions can create the most efficient outcomes because, in considering the 
desires of each side, agencies are more likely to leave both parties to the 
dispute better off than if one side had the unilateral ability to determine the 
future of sacred site land. Although tribes like the Zuni might find agency 
accommodation less desirable than protection that would give them 
complete control over their sacred sites, agency protection, which can 
accommodate competing interests while still protecting sacred sites, is 
preferable from the perspective of society as a whole. 
Furthermore, the benefit of leaving land-use determinations in agency 
hands is especially high because sacred sites regulation is rarely a zero-sum 
game. Again, as the Zuni Salt Lake example demonstrates, lands can often 
be used in a variety of different ways without foreclosing all other uses. 
Furthermore, even in instances of irreconcilable incompatibility, such as the 
flooding that destroyed the Cherokee burial sites in the Tennessee Valley,207 
it still may be best to leave such decisions in the hands of individual 
agencies, so that these types of decisions can be made on a case-by-case 
basis and not as the result of sweeping rules that leave no room for 
compromise even when compromise is an option. 
B. Protection Against Agency Abuse 
The concerns with agency protection are not unfounded. While 
agencies have the ability to provide real protection for Indian sacred sites, 
their only legal obligation is to consult with affected tribes. Observers 
understandably worry that tribes are overly dependent on agency “good 
will” for the protection of their sacred sites.208 However, the choice to leave 
 
207. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
208. Robert S. Michaelsen, Is the Miner’s Canary Silent? Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Denial of American Indian Free Exercise of Religion Claims, 6 J.L. & RELIGION 97, 105 
(1988) (arguing that “Indian religious practitioners . . . . are left with no other avenues of recourse 
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these decisions in agency hands is not one based on blind faith. If agencies 
accept their responsibility to protect Indian sacred sites, then their 
protection is preferable for the reasons discussed above. Furthermore, if 
agencies fail to adequately protect these sites, Indian sacred sites will not 
necessarily go without protection: Tribes have other forms of recourse and 
are not solely dependent on agency goodwill. 
In particular, every year for the past two decades Congress has 
protected at least one individual sacred site.209 For instance, Congress 
designated El Malpais in New Mexico a national monument in 1987.210 
This area, created by ancient lava flows, has been considered sacred by the 
Acoma, Hopi, and Zuni tribes for more than 10,000 years.211 Similarly, in 
1993 Congress passed an Act recognizing the Hawaiian island of 
Kaho’olawe, which is sacred to Native Hawaiians, as a national cultural 
treasure, permanently stopped its use as a military training facility, and then 
returned the island to the state of Hawaii.212 In 2000, Congress passed the 
Timbisha Shoshone Homeland Act, authorizing the purchase of five parcels 
of land as a reservation for the Timbisha Shoshone tribe, and an additional 
two parcels that were part of the tribes’ ancestral homeland and that have 
historical, cultural, and spiritual significance for the tribe.213 These 
individual protection statutes are similar to agency protection in that the 
determinations are made on a case-by-case basis and extend specific 
protection to individual sites, but also serve as a safety valve for those 
instances in which agency protections alone may fail. Through its readiness 
to enact such statutes, Congress has demonstrated that it is willing to 
protect individual sacred sites. Therefore, if an agency were to deny 
protection to an Indian sacred site, a tribe would still have the option of 
seeking congressional protection. 
CONCLUSION 
The courts and Congress have left sacred sites protection in the hands 
of land management agencies, and although many feared this decision 
would be disastrous, land agencies have actually embraced their role and 
sought to accommodate Indian religions and protect their sacred sites. 
 
than the good will of governmental administrative agencies”); Lee, supra note 7, at 287 
(describing how the protections of the AIRFA are dependant on agency “good will”). 
209. Indians Urge Cohesive Policy on Sacred Lands, COM. APPEAL, Dec. 14, 2002, at F4. 
210. Act of Dec. 31, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-225, 101 Stat. 1539. 
211. Joseph Maes, The Lava Tubes of El Malpais, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Jan. 16, 2003, 
at C1. 
212. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, §§ 10,001-
10,004, 107 Stat. 1418, 1480-84 (1993). 
213. Pub. L. No. 106-423, 114 Stat. 1875 (2000) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa 
note (2000)). 
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Furthermore, agency accommodation is actually better for society as a 
whole than the broader judicial and legislative protections typically 
advocated by sacred sites supporters. Agency accommodation avoids the 
disadvantages of broad categorical protection while still serving as a strong 
method for preserving sacred sites. Although land agencies have had the 
role of sacred sites protectors thrust upon them, they seem to have turned 
out to be ideally suited for the job. 
